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Mr. President : . 
~) 
President Eisenhower ' s original proposa~on the 
Middle East 
,u;~~J 
had1~two basic weaknesses . In the first place, 
it distorted the Constitutional principle of separation of 
powers . In the second place, the manner in which it was 
presented was such as to suggest a bold new policy, a new 
Doctrine for dealing with the grave problems of the Middle 
East . In fact, the approach is not new and the problems 
of the Middle East are touched hardly at all by the resolu-
tion. 
~ 
The actions of the~gent±emen of the combined com-
mittees on Armed Services and Foreign Relations and the 
initiative of the able Senator from Minnesota L Mr. Humphre,V" 
have helped to correct the first weakness in the President ' s 
proposal, the Constitutional weakness . 
The amended resolution - Senate Joint Resolution 19 -
the version which has come from the Committees, is similar to 
the President ' s in one respect . It states at least as clearly 
that this country regards as vital to our national interests 
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 51, Folder 17, Mansfield Library, University of Montana
-2-
and world peace the preservation of the independence and integrity 
of the nations of the Middle East. It states at least as clearly 
the determination of the United States to use whatever legitimate 
means may be necessary to prevent armed aggression from destroy-
ing the independence and integrity of those nations. 
Yet there is a difference. It is a difference in words 
but it is an enormous difference. It does not affect the pur-
poses of the resolution which is to forestall communist domina-
tion of the Middle East. On the contrary, it strengthens that 
purpose. It does affect, however, and it affects most pro-
foundly, the Constitutional processes by which this purpose 
shall be pursued. Under the original version, Congress was 
asked to "authorize" the President to use armed forces in the 
Middle East. That is the word vThich was employed. The Committee 
' ( 
-~
version strikes that~dangerous Constitutional concept from the 
resolution. It places responsibility for the use of armed 
forces, short of a declaration of war, more definitely where 
it belongs under the Constitution - on the President alone. 
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Is this a mere quibbling over words, Mr . President? I 
do not believe it is. I . do not believe the Senate will so regard 
it. We sball not so regard it if we stop to consider tbat in 
almost 170 years of Constitutional practice, the Formosa resolu-
tion and this resolution are, so far as I am aware, the only 
cases in which a President has asked Congress in this fashion 
for authority to employ the armed forces prior to a Declaration 
of War . Yet the armed forces bave been used nany tires through-
out our history without a Declaration of War . 
~ 
Mr. President, if in~l70 years of Constituti onal 
practice there are only two cases of this kind, both under the 
same President and both in the last few years, then it ought 
hA'~~ 
to be clear tbat this change which the CommitteeS~~e in-
valve s far nnre than a rere quibbling over words . Wbat is in-
valved is more fundamental than the action we nay or may not 
take in the Middle East crisis. It is a matter which goes to 
the heart of our system of governrent. 
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I realize, Mr. President, that in trying to clarify 
this matter, the Committees were dealing with a very difficult 
question. It may not be possible to ever draw with words that 
precise point at which the President's responsibilities as 
Commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces is divided from the 
Congressional authority to declare war. It is a distinction 
that lies in a twilight zone of power between the Executive and 
Legislative Branches of the government. 
The Committees' effort, however, has the merit of 
pv~~·\ 'o\'/ 
reversing theKdangerous precedent set by the Formosa resolution 
several years ago, a precedent which would have been affirmed 
by the acceptance of the President's version of the pending 
resolution. Carried to a logical extreme, these precedents 
of Congress "authorizing" the President "to use armed forces" 
could have only two possible outcomes. 
I speak now not of what would be likely to happen 
today or tomorrow or next year but of the decades that lie ahead. 
It is the responsibility of each Senator individually and of the 
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Senate as a whole to measure actions taken by this body not 
only against the needs of the hour but for the long future 
when others will have to live with the consequences of our 
acts. 
Carried to a logical conclusion, these precedents 
of authorizing the President to use the armed forces could 
lead on the one hand to this result. They could eventually 
convert a fundamental power of the Presidency - the power to 
command the armed forces - into a Congressional function. If 
the President comes to us now for permission to order the 
armed forces to fire if necessary in the Middle East how long 
will it be before other Presidents will feel impelled to come 
to Congress for permission to move the armed forces to the 
firing line? How long before it will be necessary to have 
Congressional permission to move a naval vessel or transfer a 
soldier out of an American port? Where would this trend leave 
the country 1n a nuclear age when instant decisions by the 
President may be necessary? 
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Reduced to their logical but ludicrous extreme, these 
precedents lead to the placing of members of Congress or their 
agents on every ship, plane and in every ground unit of the 
armed forces. Of course, I do not believe that is going to 
happen. I do say, however, that if we were to continue to build 
up these precedents of authorizing the President to use the armed 
• 
forces we would be bringing about slowly, almost itrPercept~bly, 
fundamental changes in our system of government. We would be 
moving it, in the examples I have just cited in the direction 
of a Parliamentary form of government, with the President reduced 
either to a figure-head or a mere agent of Congress. 
That then is one possible outcome of repeated actions 
by the Congress "authorizing" the President "to use armed forces". 
There is still another. In "authorizing", the Congress accepts 
responsibility for the actions which will be taken pursuant to 
, the aut her izati on. In short, it takes responsibility for 
actions which have not yet taken place and whose nature it 
cannot anticipate. It accepts responsibility for whatever 
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use the President sees fit to make of the armed forces, although 
it bas no control over those uses. In effect, it approves t~se 
uses in advance whether they are wise uses or foolish uses. 
Congress, in short) impairs its right of independent criticism 
and correction. It invites the irresponsible use of Executive 
power by sharing responsibility in matters over which it has 
no control and little specific knowledge. At the end of that 
road lies Executive tyranny. 
I do not suggest that under Mr. Eisenhower we are going 
to reach that extreme anymore than we are going to find ourselves 
suddenly functioning under a Parliamentary system of government. 
I do say, however, that both possibilities were implicit in the 
language of the original resolution. 
I know that the Senate shares my conviction that the 
form of government under which we live is worth preserving beyond 
the lifetimes of the President or any of us in the Senate. That 
is why I believe the Co~ttees of the Senate were not quibbling 
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when they altered the language in the pending resolution. They 
were performing a distinguished service by removing a Constitutional 
weakness from the original version. 
The President came to Congress for authority to use 
the armed forces prior to a Declaration of War. By this change, 
the Committees have reminded the President that only the Con-
stitution can give him that authority. 
The President came to Congress with a request that it 
assume responsibility for actions which may involve the use of 
armed forces short of a Declaration of War. The Committees 
have reminded him that only he can assume that responsibility. 
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